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THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL vs. THE PROTECTION OF PUBLIC
MORALS
In People v. Jelkel the defendant was con-
victed of two crimes of compulsory prostitution
in violation of the New York Penal Law.
2
Members of the press and public were excluded
from the courtroom during the People's case
except for such friends as the defendant re-
quested.3 In his exclusion order the trial judge
stated that in the interest of public decency he
was compelled to draw the curtain on the offen-
sive obscenity of the highly publicized trial.
4
On appeal, Jelke's conviction was reversed on
the ground that his statutory right to a public
trial had been violated although there was suf-
ficient evidence to sustain the verdict of the
jury.,
1284 App. Div. 211, 130 N.Y.S. 2d 662 (1st Dep't
1954).
2 Section 2460. The original indictment contained
nine counts.
3 During the People's case, which comprised nine
trial days, seventeen different friends of Jelke or his
attorney attended the trial. No more than twelve
and always at least one were present each day.
4 Counsel for Pat Ward, the State's principal wit-
ness, originally made application to have the public
excluded during her testimony. After granting this
request the trial judge recalled its ruling until argu-
ments could be heard. Upon completion of the
arguments, the trial judge issued the exclusion order
on his own motion.
5 The majority considered the judge's interroga-
tion of two jurors concerning their impartiality as
serious error although basing the reversal on the
fact that Jelke was denied a pubic trial. The court
The right of an accused to a public trial is
thought to be of ancient English origin and
emanates from an Anglo-American distrust for
secret proceedings. 6 Various definitions have
been given a public trial, ranging from a triar
which is not completely secret 7 to one where
all who wish to attend may do so.8 While the
right to a public trial exists primarily for the
benefit of the accused,9 some courts have
thought that this right belongs to the public as
well.'0
The Federal Constitution" and the constitu-
also held that the trial judge compounded his origi-
nal error by excluding the press and public only-
during the People's case.
6 For a discussion of the development of the public
trial concept see Radin, The Right to a Public Trial,
6 Temple L. Q. 381 (1932).
7 People v. Miller, 257 N.Y. 54, 177 N.E. 306.
(1931). Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 459, 112
Pac. 273, 274 (1918).
8 Davis v. United States 247 Fed. 394 (8th Cir.
1917). People v. Byrnes, 190 P. 2d 290 (Cal. App-
1948). These courts, of course, acknowledge that valid.
limitations on admission are imposed by the phys-
ical capacity of the courtroom and certain admin-
istrative necessities.
1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 647 (8td
ed. 1927).
10 State v. Keller, 52 Mont. 205, 156 Pac. 1080'
(1916); State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 Pac. 480,
(1928); People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 37 Pac
153 (1894).
11 U.S. Const. Amend. VI.
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tion of 41 states12 specifically require a public
trial. However, the Sixth Amendment is only
applicable in the federal courts and does not
apply to criminal prosecutions by a State.
3
Any protection of the right to a public trial
-under the Federal Constitution in a state
criminal proceeding is derived from the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
4
and as yet the elements necessary to constitute
a public trial under the due process concept are
but loosely defined.15 Extreme cases, such as
the summary punishment of a witness for
contempt in a secret one-judge grand jury
proceeding have, of course, been held invalid.16
While New York's constitution contains no
provision guaranteeing a public trial, it has
been provided for by legislative enactment.
1 7
Much of the difficulty in the Jelke case revolved
around the construction of one of these statutes,
Section 4 of the Judiciary Law which reads as
follows :18
The sittings of every court within this
state shall be public and every citizen may
freely attend the same, except trials in
cases for divorce, seduction, abortion, rape,
assault with intent to commit rape, sod-
omy, bastardy or filiation, the court may,
in its discretion, exclude therefrom all per-
sons who are not directly interested therein,
excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers
of the court.
Where the formal charge in a case of a sala-
cious nature is not one enumerated in Section 4,
a question is raised as to the intended scope
of the statute. The court in People v. Jelke,
by adopting a strict construction, held that
the discretion in the trial judge to exclude all
persons not essential to the proceedings is
12 For collection of state constitutional provisions
see Note, The Accused's Right to a Public Trial, 49
Calif. L. Rev. 110 n. 2 (1949).
"1 Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81 (1927).
14 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1947).
15 Comment, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 128, 134 (1953).
16 See note 14 supra.
7 Civil Rights Law §12; Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure §8; and Section 4 of the Judiciary Law.
's This section has long been construed as being
in pari materia with those cited in note 17.
limited to cases where the formal charge is so
enumerated. By its strict construction, the
majority overruled the only New York decision
construing the scope of Section 4, People v.
Hall.9 There a general exclusionary order was
issued barring the press and public from a trial
where the accused was charged with extortion
but where the testimony was largely concerned
with an alleged act of sodomy. On appeal,
Section 4 was broadly construed, the court
holding that the salacious nature of the case
rather than the formal charge determined the
trial court's power to exclude the press and
public.
0
In 1945, Section 4 was amended by adding
the word "sodomy.""2 This was the basis given
in the Jelke case for a strict construction of
Section 4. The majority felt that the legislature
would have used broader language if they
intended to vest in the trial court the discretion
which People v. Hall would permit. However,
such an interpretation of Section 4 does not
appear to be consonant with established rules
of statutory construction. "If a term or clause
used in the original statute has been judicially
'9 51 App. Div. 57, 64 N.Y.S. 433 (4th Dep't
1900).
20 "If a literal interpretation is to be given to
these provisions, then the trial judge is utterly with-
out any discretion whatever aside from the excepted
cases. Whoever desires to come into court, however
revolting may be the evidence adduced, the doors
must swing inward to him. School children, the
street urchins, girls of immature years, may drink
in and become poisoned by the lustful details
wormed from the witnesses. That the protection of
a 'public trial must be given to every defendant
charged-with a crime is obvious. No court in this
nation has ever held otherwise, so far as I am able to
ascertain. That principle must be upheld unim-
paired, but its retention does not entirely wrest from
the trial judge the discretion to conduct the trial in
such wise as to be consonant with good morals and
common decency and in an orderly manner." Id.
at 61, 64 N.Y.S. at 435.
2" Laws of 1945, Ch. 649, § 3. "It is further recom-
mended to include sodomy in this section in con-
formity with the dictum in People v. Hall..."
Tenth Annual Report And Studies Of The Judicial
Council, p. 176 (1944).
"See note 1 supra.
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construed, the retention of such term or clause
in a subsequent amendatory act generally
requires that it shall receive the same construc-
tion."3 Since legislative history shows an intent
to make Section 4 conform with the Hall case,
the latter's liberal construction of the statute
was apparently endorsed, although the addi-
tion of the single word "sodomy" would seem
inept for the purpose.
Assuming, however, that both the original
section and its subsequent amendnient are
sufficiently vague to permit of two diverse
interpretations, it would seem that the court
was primarily concerned with protecting the
public trial cbncept. The deleterious effect on
public morals and decency, which the publicity
attendant to this, notorious trial could have,
apparently was relegated to a position -of
secondary importance.
2 4
No public trial provision has ever been held
to deprive a judge of his power to regulate
attendance to the extent necessary to assure
the security and orderly progress of a trial.2 5
Instances where a judge has invoked this in-
herent power are numerous.26 However, these
are cases where the necessity of such procedure
is readily apparent.
23 McKinney's Consolidated Ladws,. Construction
And Interpretation of Statutes, §19j, p.,268 (1st ed.
1942).
24 The rationale for this apparent shift in emphasis
during the period between the Hall and Jelke deci-
sions might be that a free press and public trials
have become more highly valued when appraised in
the light of the totalitarian abuses witnessed in
much of the world during the last half century. Also
society's prohibitions against discussions of any-
thing of a sexual nature are now less stringent.'
25Bower, Judicial Discretion of Trial Courts.
§262 pp. 296-297 (1st ed. 1931).
26 State v. Genese, 102 N.J.L. 134, 130 Atl. 642
(1925) (to preserve courtroom decorum), Bishop v.
State, 19 Ala. App. 326, 97 So. 169 (1923) (to halt
commotion caused by spectators entering and
leaving); People v. Buck, 46 Cal.App.2d 558, 116
P. 2d (1941) (to quell disturbance during charge to
jury); Commonwealth v. Principatti, 260 Pa. 587,
104 Ad. 53 (1918), (to prevent violence against
witness); Beauchamp v. Cahill, 297 Ky. 505, 180
S.W.2d 423 (1944) (to spare young witness from
embarrassment).
The decisions are in conflict where there has
been a general exclusionary order in a trial of a
salacious nature. The controversy ostensibly
centers around the scope of "public trial."
Where only members of the bar,27 representa-
tives of the press,22 those "having business in
the, court,"29 or friends and relatives of the-
accused,30 as in the instant case, have beem
admitted some courts have reversed the con-
viction because the trial was not open to all.3"
Other courts have considered the trial public
where any of these special classes have been
present.n Admitting the propriety of certain-
exceptions, however, the more fundamental
problem would seem to be that of deciding-
whether protection of public morals merits
inclusion in these exceptions.
The benefits commonly ascribed to a trial
being public permit of division into two cate-
gories, those accruing to the public and those-
which protect the accused.n Among the first
class are said to be: permitting the public to
observe the functioning of the judicial process,
fulfilling their desire to see justice properly
administered and, to a certain class, financial
benefit from reproducing accounts of the pro-
ceedings. Since a member of the public, suing
as such, has never been held to have a legally
enforceable right to admittance where he has.
been excluded, 4 it would appear that the
public's interest is limited to the benefits re-
sulting from their unrestricted admission ta
27 State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 225, 79 N.E. 462"
(1906).
21 State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 156 Pac. 1Q
(1918); State v. Hensley, supra note 27.
1 People v. Byrnes, 190 P.2d 290 (Cal. App.
1948).
30 People v. Yeager, 113 Mich. 228, 71 N.W. 491
(1897).
31 For discussion of courts reaction to admittance
of special classes and collection of cases' se Com-
ment, 39 Calif. L. Rev. 110, 113 (1951).
Reagan v. United States, 202 Fed. 488 (9th.
cir. 1913); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d
1110 (1936).
"For an enumeration and discussion of the bene-
fits of a public trial see 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1834-
(3rd ed. 1940).
4 United Press Ass'ns v. Valenti, 281 App. Div-
395, 120 N.Y.S. 2d 174, 179 (1st Dep't 1953).
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inost trials. Moreover, in most jurisdictions, an
accused may waive his right to a public trial
and thereby effectively curtail any benefits to
the public from observation of that particular
trial.35
The principal benefits afforded the accused
by a public trial3 6 are said to be: limiting the
temptation of witnesses to testify falsely and
increasing the possibility that those who do so
will be detected, enabling persons with addi-
tional information to learn of the proceeding
and come forward, and insuring a more con-
scientious performance of their duties by judge,
jury, and counsel.
Today it would appear that the realization
of these benefits is largely dependent on wide-
spread press coverage since personal courtroom
attendance is no longer a common pastime
with the public.3 The practical result is that
an accused in a newsworthy case is the recipient
of a disproportionate amount of publicity while
the bulk of criminal prosecutions are conducted
in comparative anonymity. Hence the question
of whether the public is freely admitted or only
special classes are allowed to be present would
appear to be of decreasing significance in cases
which are little publicized. However, the true
value of a public trial is not predicated upon
the protection it affords an accused in a partic-
ular case but stems rather from a conviction that
justice will be ultimately better served if the ju-
dicial process is performed openly rather than
in secret.38 Certainly the efforts of an able coun-
35 People v. Miller, 257 N.Y. 54, 60, 177 N.E.
306, 308 (1931); United States v. Kobli, 172 F. 2d
919, (3rd Cir. 1949); State v. Smith, 179 La. 614,
154 So. 625 (1934).
36 See note 22 supra.
3 Originally, it was the custom for an accused's
neighbors to be present at his trial and those having
information would be asked to volunteer it. See
Maitland And Montague, A Sketch Of English Legal
History, p. 56-58 (1915).
Is "All the reasons for requiring publicity are of a
contingent and abstract nature. In the long run
certain general advantages are secured by a usual
practice. No tangible and positive advantage is
gained for a party in a given case by publicity or
lost by privacy. Moreover, since the whole com-
munity cannot enter, the exclusion of some only
sel and the operation of our system of appeals
offer an accused more concrete protection than
does the presence of a segment of the public at
his trial. Many states39 and noted text writers4O
have considered the interest of public decency
a worthy motive for curtailing publicity where
a trial is largely concerned with salacious de-
tail. From the nature of the protection afforded
by a public trial, its benefits would not appear
to be lost by allowing such exceptions.
In the Jelke case, the trial judge's exclusion
order was primarily intended to curtail the
extensive and sensational press coverage ac-
corded Jelke's4' arrest and trial. In an inde-
pendent collateral proceeding,4 the newspapers
attempted to gain admittance to the court
room by petitioning for a writ of prohibition
against the trial judge. However, the Appellate
Division held that the petitioners had no
standing to demand admittance to a criminal
proceeding to which they were not a party.
Freedom of the press was held not to be vio-
who might have entered does no definite harm.
Finally, in certain conditions, the advantages may
be overbalanced by disadvantages. The rule there-
fore need not be absolute and invariable. Excep-
tions may properly be recognized. It is an excess of
sentimental obstinacy to deny the propriety of al-
lowing exceptions. Wigmore, Evidence § 1835.
39The statutes are collected in Wigmore, Evi-
dence, §1836.
40 Both Wigmore and Cooley have recognized the
protection of public morals as a valid reason for
making an exception to the public trial requirement.
See notes 39, 9 supra.
41 "As early as last August the publicity in this
case reached a ship's newspaper in the Mediterra-
nean. It has now skyrocketed to the point where we
find it competing with the President's message on
the State of the Union. It is reported that the press
of three continents are reporting this trial. It is the
opinion of this court that such extensive press
coverage to a case of this kind is catering to vulgar
sensationalism, if not actual depravity." Excerpt
from the exclusion order, Brief for Appellees, p. 64.
Prior to the exclusion order, 64 seats had been re-
served for the press, leaving 56 for the general
public.
12 United Press Ass'ns v. Valenti; 203 Misc. 220,
120 N.Y.S. 2d 642, ayf'd, 281 App. Div. 395, 120
N.Y.S. 2d 174 (1st Dep't 1953).
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